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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The internet age has inspired much debate over the proper legal status of 
digital music sampling.1  The role and power of online music media has only 
skyrocketed since the Ninth Circuit’s decision regarding Napster in 2001, and 
further technological developments in digital music have made the creation and 
distribution of music online even more effortless than it was at the beginning of 
the twenty-first century.2  This progress has fueled a problem few could have 
foreseen in 2001: the rise of digital sampling in free, self-released music that is 
not released through any record company or publisher, but is uploaded online 
by an amateur, unsigned artist.3 
Historically, especially before the advent of MP3s and file sharing, these free 
self-released compilations of music were not likely to face legal challenge for the 
borrowed samples of other pre-established artists used within the tracks.  Such 
music was released non-commercially by a person attempting to gain local clout 
and prominence, in the hopes that it would eventually lead to public 
performances and the opportunity to be seen and heard by talent scouts.  These 
compilations sampling different commercially released tracks, or free 
“mixtapes,” were distributed physically from street corners, clubs, or other public 
locations.  With this distribution method, there was little chance that any of the 
tracks would receive massive mainstream attention or draw the ear of those 
artists being sampled on the tracks. 
However, this is no longer the case.  Unlike music’s past changes in format 
and medium (i.e., cassette to CD), the MP3 and internet have “exposed 
consumers to more music than ever before,”4 and have also provided a method 
by which an amateur artist can release musical creations to an immediate 
audience at very little or no cost through such outlets as Bandcamp, 
Soundcloud, YouTube, and personal websites.  Soundcloud, a website in which 
users can upload and share their tracks online, has become a particularly 
prominent forum and tool for the amateur artist; as of April 2013, the site has 
over thirty-eight million users, all of whom have the opportunity to interact, 
                                                                                                                   
 1 Aaron M. Bailey, Note, A Nation of Felons?: Napster, the Not Act, and the Criminal Prosecution of 
File Sharing, 50 AM. U. L. DEV. 473, 475 (2000). 
 2 A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Neil S. Tyler, 
Comment, Music Piracy and Diminishing Revenues: How Compulsory Licenses for Interactive Webcasters Can 
lead the Recording Industry Back to Prominence, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 2101, 2110 (2013). 
 3 See infra discussion Part II.B. 
 4 David Goldman, Music’s Lost Decade: Sales Cut in Half, Feb. 3, 2010, http://money.cnn.com/ 
2010/02/02/news/companies/napster_music_industry/; Sam Gustin, Digital Music Sales Finally 
Surpassed Physical Sales in 2011, Jan. 6, 2012, http://business.time.com/2012/01/06/digital-music-
sales-finally-surpassed-physical-sales-in-2011/. 
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share and provide feedback on any uploaded songs.5  Though not all of those 
users upload their musical creations, the number is indicative of a changing 
musical landscape that is far more populist in nature.6  Sites such as these 
represent an overarching, continuing movement in which artists and listeners 
themselves control the art form. 
In addition to increasing the sheer volume of music available to the masses 
and giving amateur artists a more readily available platform, this new 
environment also has had a profound effect on the sound and nature of the 
music that emerged.  Though digital sampling was considered an “indispensable 
element [of] the music industry” even in 1996,7 the ability to create, share, and 
listen to music on a computer or laptop has made the digital sample a 
ubiquitous presence in the industry.8  The digital music world has encouraged a 
greater melding of genres and cultures into newly created music, allowing digital 
sampling in particular to merge diverse sounds into something at once unique 
and familiar.  Sampling a known riff, beat, chorus or hook in a song articulates 
universal emotions while still creating something wholly new, much like how 
finding a common ground through a shared language allows a speaker to 
connect with a greater number of people.9    
Another essential factor contributing to the increase of digital sampling in 
music is that sampling better serves new consumer tastes brought on by 
mobilization.  Talking Heads frontman David Byrne argues in his book, How 
Music Works, that the sound of music is influenced significantly by both the 
venue in which it is heard as well as the technology available at the time.10  For 
example, music today is played frequently in cars and in portable MP3 players 
                                                                                                                   
 5 Ryan Mac, Soundcloud Manages Criticism as it Moves to Become the YouTube of Audio, FORBES (Apr. 
26, 2013, 10:30 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ryanmac/2013/04/26/soundcloud-manages 
-criticism-as-it-moves-to-become-the-youtube-of-audio/. 
 6 Tyler, supra note 2, at 2110–11. 
 7 Robert M. Szymanski, Audio Pastiche: Digital Sampling, Intermediate Copying, Fair Use, 3 UCLA 
ENT. L. REV. 271, 278 (1996). 
 8 Joanna Kao, Music Shaping Notworks Propagate Mashup Popularity, USA TODAY COLLEGE (Apr. 
1, 2012, 1:05 AM), http://college.usatoday.com/2012/04/01/mustic-sharing-networks-propagat 
e-mashup-popularity. 
 9 See DAVID BYRNE, HOW MUSIC WORKS 131 (2012) (comparing sampling’s use of “hooks 
and choruses [from other songs] like a knowing reference or quote” to “quot[ing] a familiar 
refrain to a friend or lover to express your feelings,” and concluding that “[s]ong references are 
like emotional shortcuts and social acronyms”). 
 10 Id. at 13, 139–81 (exploring autobiographically the many ways that recording and playback 
technology shaped popular music throughout the author’s career). 
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such as the iPod, encouraging more bass-heavy, beat-driven music.11  The 
private listening experience in a car or through the iPod and headphones is 
more conducive to music consisting of “interlocking and layered beats” than 
the venues and outlets of the past.12  These new features of music showcase the 
rising appeal of genres such as hip-hop, the beat-focused orchestrations of 
which also allow for greater separation between the recorded sound and live 
musician.  Additionally, technology and digital sampling can also mask the 
deficiencies of the musician, allowing even amateur musicians to not only utilize 
samples of official tracks, but avoid any sloppiness or egregious errors in the 
recordings.13  
Although artists self-releasing these uploads seek hype and popularity over 
monetary gain, the unsigned artist may incidentally gain profits from uploading 
and posting their music to Bandcamp, YouTube, or other personally created 
sites.  This can be accomplished by directly charging listeners for a direct 
download of their music, or through an advertising system in which the artist 
accrues revenue for each visitor to his site and each time a link or page is 
clicked.  The music industry has even tapped into these online fora to scout 
potential talent, and multiple recording deals have been garnered from nothing 
more than a digital upload to one of these sites.  Yet the industry’s acceptance 
and utilization of this do-it-yourself, independent culture also effectuates new 
conflict and issues.  Most importantly, it increases the possibility that an 
unauthorized sample within a particular amateur composition will come to the 
attention of the rights holder or creator of the sampled original. 
Consequently, the number of legal disputes over unauthorized samples has 
surged since the early ‘90s.14  One recent noteworthy conflict involves up-and-
coming artist Frank Ocean and the classic rock group The Eagles.  Ocean 
initiated the conflict by utilizing a sample of The Eagles’ “Hotel California” as 
part of a free, downloadable mixtape.  The Eagles regarded the sample as 
                                                                                                                   
 11 See id. at 127–32 (discussing the rise of sampling and culminating in treatment of hip-hop as 
a new musical form that has resulted); id. at 134–37 (discussing the iPod and Walkman as 
significant forces in the developments). 
 12 Id. at 27. 
 13 Id. at 169 (stating that, with software, “[s]evere or ‘amateurish’ unsteadiness or poorly played 
tempo changes can be avoided”). 
 14 Joe Fassler, How Copyright Law Hurts Music, From Chuck D to GirlTalk: A Conversation with 
Kambrew McLeod, co-author of Creative License: The law and Culture of Digital Sampling, THE 
ATLANTIC (Apr. 12, 2011, 9:05 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2011/ 
04/how-copyright-law-hurts-music-from-chuch-d-o-girltalk/236975/ (citing K. McLeod) (asserting 
that there is now a “litigious sampling culture” and that it will only get worse). 
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copyright infringement and are considering legal action,15 even though Ocean 
released the song at a time when he had made little, if any, profit from his music 
career, was not signed to any record company, and garnered no profit from the 
specific song.  Cases similar to this one are increasing; however courts have yet 
to establish a uniform standard to reconcile these new, unique circumstances 
with copyright law, overall leaving trial courts and parties in the dark as to how 
to resolve them. 
For example, there are two possible ways to resolve this inconsistency and 
grant better legal certainty to courts and parties wrestling with these recent 
technology and industry changes.  First, digital sampling in music should fall 
under the doctrine of fair use.  Second, if non-commercially released music 
incidentally garners profits, is eventually released commercially, or is publicly 
performed for profit, the artist should be subject to a compulsory licensing fee 
for any previously unauthorized sample within those works, achieved by a 
Congressional amendment to section 115 of the Copyright Act.  With this 
policy, United States copyright law will both maintain the incentive to create 
new, original works and effectively promote the burgeoning, expansive online 
music culture and its continued innovation and public enrichment.  Altogether, 
this dual solution will ease enforcement and account for the technological shifts 
in the music industry by avoiding both speculative remedies and the stifling of 
current music culture’s mixing and sampling. 
Part II of this Note will outline the general background of copyright law, as 
well as the legal history of digital sampling that has led to this litigious state of 
affairs.  Next, Part III will examine the current problems in case law regarding 
unauthorized digital sampling, and will elaborate on this dual solution that 
better functions in the present musical and technological environment.  Finally, 
Part IV will reiterate the need for this solution and further emphasize how the 
amendment will ultimately promote the balance that the Framers sought to 
achieve with copyright law. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  COPYRIGHT LAW AND MUSIC 
The foundations of copyright law in the United States trace back to the 
ratification of the Constitution in 1788.  Believing it necessary “to incentivize 
                                                                                                                   
 15 Rob Morkmon, The Eagles Considering Legal Action Against Frank Ocean, MTV.COM (Mar. 1, 
2012), http://www.mtv.com/news/1680219/eht-eagles-Frank-Ocean-legalaction. 
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creation and public dissemination of artist works,”16 the Framers of the 
Constitution assigned Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors 
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”17  As outlined 
in section 102 of the Copyright Act, copyright protection generally applies to 
“original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression,”18 
which essentially requires that a work be an original expression of an idea—
implying some minimal level of creativity.19  Copyright protection originates the 
moment the work is fixed: there is no prerequisite of publication.20  
Despite the implicit inclusion of “musical works” in the supreme document 
of the United States,21 music as it is currently known did not experience 
comprehensive copyright protection until 1972 when the Copyright Act was 
amended to extend protection to “sound recordings.”22  This extension was 
significant to the music industry because the actual sounds elicited from the 
protected musical composition, encapsulated in the original recording of the 
musical work, were now protected as well.  A musical composition “consists of 
rhythm, harmony, and melody, and it is from these elements that originality is 
to be determined.”23  It essentially “captures an artist’s music in written form,” 
and “protects the generic sound that would necessarily result from any 
performance of the piece.”24  In contrast, sound recordings are defined as 
                                                                                                                   
 16 Armen Boyajian, The Sound of Money: Securing Copyright, Royalties, and Creative “Progress” in the 
Digital Music Revolution, 62 FED. COMM. L.J. 587, 594 (2010) (addressing the Framers’ incentive 
behind the inclusion of the clause). 
 17 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 18 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1990) (listing the specific types of work that copyright both protects and 
does not protect). 
 19 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). 
 20 17 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1998) (clarifying that a work need not be published to obtain copyright 
protection). 
 21 Federal Copyright Protection For Pre-1972 Sound Recordings, UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 
http://www.copyright.gov/docs/sound (last visited Aug. 25, 2014). 
 22 17 U.S.C. § 114  (1998) (listing exclusive rights of the owner of a copyright in a sound 
recording); see also Lucille M. Ponte, The Emperor Has No Clothes: How Digital Sampling Infringement 
Cases are Exposing Weaknesses in Traditional Copyright Law and the Need for Statutory Reform, 43 AM. 
BUS. L.J. 515, 524 (2006) (stating that sound recordings did not receive copyright protection until 
1972 because “Congress did not view them as separate copyrightable works coming within the 
constitutional parameters of ‘writings of an author’ ”).  
 23 Newton v. Diamond, 204 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1249 (holding that rap/alternative rock group 
the Beastie Boys did not violate the plaintiff’s musical composition copyright); see also 3 MELVILLE 
B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.05[D] (1992).  
 24 Newton, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 1249; see also Dustin Mets, Did Congress Protect the Recording Industry 
Into Competition? The Irony of the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act, 22 U. DAYTON L. 
REV. 371, 372–73 (1997). 
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“works that result from the fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or other 
sounds . . . regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as disks, tapes, 
or other phonorecords, in which they are embodied.”25  In other words, sound 
recordings are the “sound[s] produced by the performer’s rendition of the 
musical [composition].”26  After its codification in 1972, owners of sound 
recordings were then able to obtain the exclusive rights outlined in § 106,27 
including the right to “prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted 
work.”28  This amendment effectively meant that a song or musical work could 
possess two distinct copyrights—the right to control the use of the composition 
as well as the recorded performance of that composition—and this distinction is of 
particular importance for digital sampling cases. 
However, the Framer’s clearly indicated copyright law to balance the 
competing interests of incentivizing creation and ensuring freedom to 
information by limiting the term of copyright,29 thereby “advancing the public 
good through ultimate access to those enriching original works.”30  Legislators, 
therefore, have limited copyright owners’ exclusive rights in provisions 
throughout copyright law.31  In addition to the time limitation of copyright 
protection (life plus seventy years), the law also limits owners’ exclusive rights 
through means such as the fair use, first sale, and merger doctrines, as well as 
through compulsory licensing.32  
These limitations were, in many instances, implemented by Congress in an 
effort to adapt copyright law to changes and technological advancements in the 
commercial sector.33  Compulsory licensing, for example, “grew out of a 
concern in Congress that the music industry was going to develop into a 
gigantic monopoly.”34  It requires the rights holder to license the work to 
“anyone else that wants to use it in a phonorecord . . . for a specific payment 
                                                                                                                   
 25 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010) (defining the terms within the Copyright Act). 
 26 Newton, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 1249–50; see generally NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 23, § 2.10. 
 27 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2002) (codifying the exclusive rights of the rights holder). 
 28 Id. § 106(2). 
 29 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 30 Boyajian, supra note 16, at 593 (emphasis added). 
 31 Id. at 596–97. 
 32 Though not an exhaustive list of the limitations affecting exclusivity rights of copyright 
owners, these provisions are of particular applicability and importance in the field of music.  Id. 
 33 DONALD S. PASSMAN, ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE MUSIC BUSINESS 368, 507 
(Rosetta Books LLC ed., Donald Passman 8th ed. 2013) (stating that Congress enacted section 
114 of the Copyright Act in 1972 to combat duplication of sound recordings, which was 
becoming pervasive). 
 34 Id. 
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established by law.”35  To qualify for compulsory licensing, the individual or 
entity must fulfill each requirement of section 115 of the Copyright Act.36  
There are three requirements for an original work: (1) the song is a non-
dramatic musical work, (2) has been previously recorded, and (3) has been 
distributed publicly in phonorecords.37  A non-dramatic musical work is, for all 
intents and purposes, one which is not written for a musical or opera.38  By 
“previously recorded,” the statute emphasizes that the artist must have actually 
recorded the original work before it can fall under compulsory licensing.39  
Thirdly, to be distributed publicly in phonorecords, the song must be an 
“audio-only recording.”40  In 1995, Congress clarified that compulsory licensing 
can apply to digital phonorecord deliveries (DPD).41  
Once these requirements for an original recording have been met, the 
statute then shifts its focus to the licensee, requiring that the new recording 
does not “change the basic melody or fundamental character of the work” and 
is only used in phonorecords.42  This requirement effectively excludes 
compulsory licensing from encompassing digital samples.  In fact, copyright law 
was largely silent on the legality of the digital sample until the last decade of the 
twentieth century.43  With no explicit provision outlining the treatment of digital 
sampling, the courts characterized a sample as an infringement of the sound 
recording copyright and illegal without authorization from the rights holder;44 
however, by the time the courts addressed sampling, the practice had already 
become pervasive in the industry and would not feasibly be discontinued.45  
Consequently, the responsibility for regulating and implementing policies 
                                                                                                                   
 35 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2002). 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 PASSMAN, supra note 33, at 222. 
 39 Id. 
 40 See 17 U.S.C. § 101, which defines “phonorecords” as any material object “in which 
sounds . . . are fixed . . . and from which the sounds are perceived . . . or otherwise 
communicated,” but which excludes from this definition such recordings which “accompan[y] a 
motion picture or other audio visual.” 
 41 Id. § 115. 
 42 Id. § 115(a)(2). 
 43 Fassler, supra note 14 (“The suit that really put an end to the ‘Wild West’ era of sampling was 
Grand Upright vs Warner Brothers Records, in 1991.”). 
 44 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005), citing 17 U.S.C. 
§ 114 (giving owner the exclusive rights to the duplication or recapturing of the “actual sounds 
fixed in a recording”). 
 45 Fassler, supra note 14 (“Record companies . . . didn’t pay attention to what these artists were 
doing.”). 
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pertaining to the digital sample had been left to the music industry for most of 
the twentieth century.46  
In regards to legal disputes on digital sampling, two defenses are available to 
a defendant: fair use or de minimis use.47  Fair use, described in section 107 of the 
Copyright Act, provides a four-factor test by which the court may determine 
whether the infringement falls under fair use.  These four factors include: (1) 
the “purpose and character of the use,” (2) the “nature of the copyrighted 
work,” (3) the “amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole” and, (4) the “effect of the use upon the potential 
market for or value of the copyrighted work.”48  Even if a plaintiff proves 
infringement, the defendant may avoid liability by showing that use of the 
original work passed this four-factor test.  A fair use analysis is governed by 
principles of equity, and the consideration and weight given to each factor is 
determined by the circumstances and facts of each case.  The court is ultimately 
seeking to satisfy and maintain the balance between promotion of creative work 
and an author’s exclusive rights.  In essence, the fair use defense helps ensure 
that copyright law does not unreasonably impede express or future innovation.  
Cases in which the fair use defense prevails usually are ones in which the harm 
to the owner of the copyright is minimal, but the harm to the other person’s 
work would be substantial.49 
Though no single factor of the fair use test is necessarily determinative, the 
“purpose and character of the use” of the infringer’s work normally weighs 
heavy in the judge’s decision.50  If the work at issue is transformative, meaning 
that it “adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, 
altering the first with new expression, meaning or message,” the defendant’s 
work will not be considered infringing.51  It must change “a plaintiff’s 
copyrighted work or use[ ] the plaintiff’s copyrighted work in a different 
context” to be considered a “new creation,”52 and not “merely repackage[ ] or 
                                                                                                                   
 46 17 U.S.C. § 115(b)(1) (2010). 
 47 John W. Gregory, A Necessary Global Discussion for Improvements to U.S. Copyright Law on Music 
Sampling, 15 GONZ. J. INT’L L. 76 (2011) (asserting that the defendant has the ability to assert 
these two defenses once the copyright owner proves infringement). 
 48 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1992). 
 49 See, e.g., Sony Corp. of America v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (finding fair 
use where activity yields social benefits outweighing a particular likelihood of harm to the 
copyright holder). 
 50 Gregory, supra note 47, at 89–90 (stating that decision will “often” hinge on whether work is 
transformative). 
 51 Id. at 86.  
 52 Wall Data, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 447 F.3d 769, 778 (9th Cir. 2006). 
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republish[ ] the original”53 so that the two are not substantially similar.54  A 
caveat to this fair use defense, especially relevant to its application in sampling 
cases, is that it is only available if the artist has obtained access to the work 
lawfully, meaning, for example, that the sample could not have stemmed from 
an illegal MP3 download of the sampled song.55  
Secondly, a defendant may assert another affirmative defense to 
infringement, the de minimis defense.  This defense is applicable when a 
defendant’s copying was so small and trivial that it should be allowed.56  In 
regards to digital sampling cases, many courts have opted to analyze the de 
minimis nature of a use through the fragmented literal similarity test, which 
implements a qualitative and quantitative examination of the portion that was 
copied.57  The quantitative portion evaluates the amount that was copied, 
usually the number of notes or “protectable expression” extracted from the 
copyrighted work by the defendant.58  If the amount copied is substantial, the 
test weighs heavily in favor of the plaintiff, but the court will still consider 
whether the portion copied is qualitatively significant or distinctive of the 
original work to the extent that is available in cases involving alleged 
infringement through digital sampling.59  The de minimis defense will necessarily 
be strengthened in a case in which the elements of the copied portion are 
generic, unoriginal, and widely used.60  Overall, these defenses and legal issues 
involving digital sampling became widely contested after sampling’s “golden 
age” gave way to a flood of litigation in the early ‘90s.61 
                                                                                                                   
 53 Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (1990). 
 54 Id. at 1123. 
 55 H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 1, at 18 (1998) (outlining the purposes of the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act). 
 56 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 797 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that a 
de minimis defense was no longer valid in digital sampling cases with unauthorized samples). 
 57 Id. at 797. 
 58 Newton v. Diamond, 204 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1254 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (concluding that the three-
note sequence utilized by the Beastie Boys was neither qualitatively nor quantitatively significant).  
 59 Id. at 1257.  But see infra notes 13–113 and accompanying text (discussing the approach by 
some courts in which no de minimis defense is available). 
 60 Newton, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 1256–57. 
 61 Fassler, supra note 14 (claiming that sampling had a golden age from 1987–1992). 
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B.  THE RISE OF DIGITAL SAMPLING AFTER THE MP3 
The act of sampling “involves incorporating portions of previously recorded 
works into a new musical composition.”62  This is a form of borrowing that has 
pervaded music culture since its origin.63  Until the rise of the MP3 and other 
technological advances at the turn of the century, however, sampling was a 
process that required a precise skill set and the presence of either original 
physical copies or a professional studio.64  For unsigned amateur artists, this 
meant relying on “two turntables and a stereo mixer” and sampling only the 
vinyl records in their possession.65  Artists had to “create analog cut-ups with 
razor blades and tape” in order to solidify a recording of the song with the 
sample.66  Therefore, due to these restraints, sampling was usually relegated to 
professionally produced records in the studio or live performances with a DJ.67 
Digital technology, however, provided an amateur artist not only access to a 
limitless library of songs (whether legally or through illegal file-sharing services) 
but also a way to create samples digitally.68  Devices such as the Musical 
Instrument Digital Interface (MIDI) made sampling substantially “easier and 
more affordable” by recording the original sound onto a computer as a digital 
file from which the amateur artist can extract the sample.69  The process of 
sampling continues to become more simplified; for example, a software 
application dubbed “Noisepad,” developed in 2012, further eliminated the 
resources and steps needed to create a sample, by allowing amateur artists to 
craft a digital sample with little more than an MP3 and an iPhone or iPad.70  
These significant simplifications of the sampling process have resulted in a 
flood of sound recordings that include unauthorized samples, many of which 
have been uploaded online by unsigned artists.  
The sampling itself usually takes one of three forms.  The first two are 
similar: artists may use “one segment of a prior song and ‘loop[ ]’ the segment 
throughout the new work,” or they may take only a “small part of a copyrighted 
                                                                                                                   
 62 Rebecca Morris, When is a CD Factory Not Like a Dance Hall?: The Difficulty of Establishing 
Third-Party Liability for Infringing Digital Music Samples, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 257, 262 
(2000). 
 63 Note, Not in Court ‘Cause I Stole a Beat: The Digital Music Sampling Debate’s Discourse on Race and 
Culture, and the Need for Test Case Litigation, 2012 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 141, 145–46. 
 64 Id. at 147. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. at 147–48. 
 69 Id. at 147. 
 70 Noisepad (Music), iPads Advisor (Blog) (May 25, 2013), 2013 WLNR 12907374. 
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song, sometimes altering the sampled music beyond recognition.”71  Far 
different from these two forms, an artist may also perform a “ ‘mash up’ 
sampling,” which “takes elements of previous songs or other sound recordings 
and inserts them into new songs.”72  All three forms are now practiced and 
utilized in almost every genre.73  This shift to a more populist music 
environment, however, has produced uncertainty as to the application of 
copyright law principles to this seismic shift, and its regulations and 
enforcement mechanisms must be adjusted to account for the massive influx of 
music creation and publication.74    
C.  COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE DIGITAL SAMPLE 
While copyright law fails to directly address the particular issue of digital 
sampling in any statute,75 an understood, established process has evolved by 
which artists can obtain official authorization for the sample and avoid future 
liability for infringement.  Courts elect to adjudicate digital sampling cases 
through an analysis of both the copyright for the musical score in the original 
song, as well as the copyright for the sound recording itself.76  Yet due to the 
lack of explicit, statutory guidelines, the act of clearing a sample can be a 
convoluted and expensive process for an artist.77 
Because no specific provision for samples exists under section 115 of the 
Copyright Act,78 rightsholders have no legal obligation to license the rights of 
the original song to another artist wanting to create a sample.79  Furthermore, 
                                                                                                                   
 71 Gregory, supra note 47, at 79; see also David M. Morrison, Bridgeport Redux: Digital Sampling and 
Audience Recording, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 75, 90–91 (2008) (categorizing 
the different types of samples that artists tend to utilize). 
 72 Gregory, supra note 47, at 79; see also Morrison, supra note 71, at 90–91. 
 73 Gregory, supra note 47, at 79 (stating that “[t]oday, artists of all genres implement sampling”). 
 74 Tracy L. Reilly, Debunking the Top Three Myths of Digital Sampling: An Endorsement of the 
Bridgeport Music Court’s Attempt to Afford “Sound” Copyright Protection to Sound Recordings, 31 COLUM. 
J.L. & ARTS 355, 393 (2008) (“Since anyone is a potential musician, the gap between the 
performer and his audience has been bridged to the extent that much of the ‘mythology’ 
associated with the creation of music has eroded.”). 
 75 See Lucille M. Ponte, The Emperor Has No Clothes: How Digital Sampling Infringement Cases are 
Exposing Weaknesses in Traditional Copyright Law and the Need for Statutory Reform, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 
515, 522 (2006) (“Much of copyright law was developed prior to the practice of digital sampling, 
leaving some doubt as to its applicability to current digital sampling disputes.”). 
 76 See id. at 522–23 (“[C]ourts have considered two distinct forms of ownership, one copyright 
for the musical score and another copyright for the sound recording.”). 
 77 PASSMAN, supra note 33, at 375–76. 
 78 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2006) (outlining the persons to which rights holders are required to license 
their works). 
 79 PASSMAN, supra note 33, at 376. 
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even if the rightsholder is willing to comply, the sampling artist has to make 
“whatever deal the rights owners decide to bless [him or her] with.”80  In other 
words, the rightsholder can dictate the price, the subsequent royalty, and even 
choose to potentially limit any granted usage by reserving a portion of the 
copyright.81  Rather than incentivizing an artist to undergo the proper legal 
process for clearing a sample, the lack of statutory regulation has exacerbated 
the “catch me if you can” attitude pertaining to the use of samples in music 
culture.82  The unsigned, independent artists may revel in the false sense of 
security that their unauthorized sample is legally unnoticed due to their 
anonymity, yet the expansion of the Internet and online music culture has made 
that reliance increasingly risky and heightened the possibility of litigation.83   
D.  DIGITAL SAMPLING IN CASE LAW 
1.  Unauthorized Digital Samples as Per Se Infringement.  Though legal treatment 
of unauthorized samples varies, certain courts have established a strict 
precedent within their jurisdictions.  Two cases have effectively established a 
hard-line legal precedent regarding digital sampling—Grand Upright Music Limited 
v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc. and Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films.84  The first 
line of the opinion in Grand Upright Music, “[t]hou shalt not steal,” clarifies that 
the court’s decision sought to end the sampling culture of borrowing without 
asking.85  Though the decisions of these two cases were fifteen years apart, the 
court’s basic analysis in each were largely the same in that neither provided for a 
defense for unauthorized sampling of a sound recording.  
In the first of these two cases, Grand Upright Music, the court treated the 
issue of whether the plaintiffs effectively owned the copyright to the sampled 
song as the sole, determinative question of fact in deciding if the unauthorized 
sampling was a punishable instance of infringement.86  As Judge Duffy stated, 
                                                                                                                   
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. at 375; see also Note, supra note 63, at 154 (“Such a burden upon independent artists of 
limited resources actually works to encourage illegal sampling rather than compliance.”). 
 83 See JuNelle Harris, Beyond Fair Use: Expanding Copyright Misuse to Protect Digital Free Speech, 13 
TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 83, 97 (2004) (“Thanks to the ease and visibility of infringement on the 
Internet, copyright owners are increasingly targeting individual copyright infringers . . . .”). 
 84 Grand Upright Music Limited v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 182, 182 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991); Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005).  See 
also James A. Johnson, Thou Shall Not Steal: A Primer on Music Licensing, 80 JUN. N.Y. ST. B.A. 23, 
23–24 (2008). 
 85 Grand Upright Music, 780 F. Supp. at 182. 
 86 Id. at 183. 
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“[t]he only issue . . . seems to be who owns the copyright to the [sampled] 
song.”87  The most persuasive evidence leading to conclude the court that the 
plaintiffs properly owned the copyright was a letter from the defendant to the 
plaintiff requesting consent to use portions of the song for payment.88  Though 
Warner Brothers Records, Inc., the defendant, “had a department set up 
specifically to obtain such clearances,” the record company instead chose to 
“unilaterally release the [artist’s] album and single,” putting the onus on the 
artist himself to deal with any ramifications regarding his use of an unauthorized 
sample.89  The court found this practice to demonstrate that the defendants 
only cared about potential profits and exhibited a “callous disregard for the 
law.”  Therefore, believing measures beyond a preliminary injunction were 
justified, the court decorated that any further legal consequences that stemmed 
from the use of the sample should fall upon the record company itself, rather 
than the artist.90  Overall, the defense’s arguments, which the court essentially 
boiled down to “stealing is rampant in the music industry and . . . should be 
excused,” were not only asinine to the court, but violated copyright law and the 
“Seventh Commandment.”91 
Over a decade after the Grand Upright decision, its strict standard was 
revisited in Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, another case involving an 
unauthorized use of a digital sample.  Bridgeport is widely regarded as the 
landmark case relating to digital sampling (as it pertains to sound recording 
copyright) for the court’s precedent of a “bright-line test” for determining 
whether a digital sample constitutes a copyright violation.92  The court analyzed 
the digital sample present in the rap song “100 Miles and Runnin’,” which was 
the subject of a copyright owned by No Limit Films and was included in the 
soundtrack of the movie I Got the Hook Up.93  In a holding that ultimately 
redefined the legal examination of digital samples, the court overturned the 
district court’s grant of summary judgment on the grounds that the “alleged 
infringement” of the sample was “de minimis and therefore not actionable.”94 
                                                                                                                   
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. at 184 (“[T]he most persuasive evidence . . . comes from the actions and admissions of 
the defendants.”). 
 89 Id. at 185. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. at 183 (concluding that the use of an unauthorized sample was inexcusably stealing). 
 92 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005).  Cf. Newton v. 
Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2004) (adjudicating on whether a musical composition copyright 
was infringed in a sample).  
 93 Bridgeport Music, Inc., 410 F.3d at 795. 
 94 Id. 
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“[One hundred] Miles” utilized a digital sample extracted from the 
composition and sound recording entitled “Get Off Your Ass and Jam” by 
George Clinton, Jr. and the Funkadelics.95  Bridgeport and Westbound each 
claimed copyright to both the musical composition and sound recording of the 
sampled song.96  As stated by one of the expert witnesses in the case, “[one 
hundred] Miles” took a two-second sample from the original’s opening guitar 
solo, lowered the pitch and “ ‘looped’ and extended [it] to 16 beats.”97  It 
subsequently appears in “five places” in the sound recording of the rap song, 
with “each looped segment last[ing] approximately 7 seconds.”98  Based on this 
evidence the district court concluded that, under a “qualitative/quantitative 
de minimis analysis [also referred to as the] ‘fragmented literal similarity’ test,” the 
digital sample of the original was utilized in a way that was “original and 
creative and therefore entitled to copyright protection.”99  A juror “familiar with 
the works of George Clinton,” reasoned the district court, would have difficulty 
even identifying the source of the sample heard in the sound recording, 
evidence that the sample was not qualitatively substantial to the original 
recording.100  Therefore in consideration of the “small amount of copying 
involved” (quantitative de minimis analysis) and the fact that the two songs did 
not share sounds qualitatively significant to one another (so as to make them 
similar in sound or composition), the court granted summary judgment in favor 
of No Limit Films.101 
In reversing the district court’s ruling, the Sixth Circuit took issue with the 
applicability of any strain of a substantial similarity test (including fragmented 
literal similarity), rejecting the assertion that a court should analyze digital 
sampling cases in the same manner as “infringement of a musical composition 
copyright.”102  The court then essentially outlined an entirely different approach 
for applying copyright law to digital sampling.  Though it admitted the 
impossibility of providing a “one size fits all test” to such activity,103 the Sixth 
Circuit recognized that digital sampling is an increasingly common practice in 
the music industry that has caused a “plethora of copyright disputes,” creating 
the need for a concrete legal rule.104 
                                                                                                                   
 95 Id. at 796. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. at 797. 
 100 Id. at 798. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 104 Id. at 799.  See also 17 U.S.C. § 114 (2012). 
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The foundation of the Bridgeport court’s analysis rested with section 114 of 
the Copyright Act.105  In addition to generally reaffirming that the owner of 
copyright in a sound recording enjoyed the exclusive rights of an author stated 
in section 106, this section further defines the nature of the “derivative works” 
protected under the sound recording copyright.106  The owner of such copyright 
has exclusive rights not to only the duplication or recapturing of the “actual 
sounds fixed in the recording,” but also to those derivative works “in which the 
actual sounds fixed in the sound recording are rearranged, remixed, or 
otherwise altered in sequence or quality.”107  However, these rights do not 
extend to derivative sound recordings that “consist[ ] entirely of an independent 
fixation of other sounds, even though such sounds imitate or simulate those in 
the copyrighted sound recording.”108 
The court adopted a literal approach to its statutory interpretation of section 
114.109  Because the statute explicitly states that the copyright owner has the 
exclusive right of any reproduction or duplication of the sound recording, the 
Sixth Circuit deduced that this encompassed the duplication of any actual, 
original sound within the recording as well, even if that exact sound was merely 
a piece or small segment of the recording.110  Thus, no de minimis analysis is 
needed—even if a “small part of a sound recording is sampled, the part taken is 
something of value,” and “no further proof” is necessary.111  In other words, no 
justification, whether it be the seemingly inhibitory cost to obtain the sample or 
the effort needed to follow through with the process of authorizing the sample, 
is adequate to sidestep the provisions outlined in section 114.112  Consequently, 
the Sixth Circuit held that any unauthorized digital sample is per se 
infringement.113 
                                                                                                                   
 105 17 U.S.C. § 114 (2010). 
 106 Id. (outlining the exclusive rights of a copyright owner protected under law, which include 
the right to reproduce the copyrighted work, prepare derivative works, distribute copies or 
phonorecords of the work, public perform and display the work, and perform the work by means 
of a digital audio transmission); see also id. § 106. 
 107 Id. § 114(b). 
 108 Bridgeport Music, Inc., 410 F.3d at 800 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 114(b)).  In its added emphasis of 
“entirely,” the court attempted to show that the work utilizing an unauthorized sample could 
never fall under protection of the statute, for the sample disqualifies it from being categorized as 
an entirely independent creation. 
 109 Id. at 805. 
 110 Id. at 800. 
 111 Id. at 802. 
 112 Id. at 801 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 114 as evidence). 
 113 Id. (“Get a license or do not sample.”). 
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The Bridgeport court also supported its hardline holding with several practical 
reasons.  First, the court reiterated the far too subjective nature of any type of 
“substantial similarity” test, which inevitably leads to inconsistent judgments 
and further obscures whether a given sample constitutes copyright 
infringement.114  Though this appears to stifle future creativity and innovation 
in the music industry, the Sixth Circuit countered that its rule fundamentally 
favors the artist, for inevitably “today’s sampler is tomorrow’s samplee.”115  
Though the legislative history provided no real guidance as to how digital 
sampling was intended to be construed under copyright law, the court intimated 
that it’s clear per se infringement standard for unauthorized samples was the 
most effective approach to providing much-needed stability to the current, 
chaotic music climate.116  Any further adaptations or fee adjustments, the court 
stated, could be worked out by either the music industry or Congress itself.117 
2.  Rejection of Per Se Infringement Pertaining to Unauthorized Digital Sampling.  In 
the years following the Bridgeport decision, some courts have declined to utilize 
the per se infringement rule for unauthorized digital sampling.  Instead, they 
have opted for the less extreme approach of attempting to reconcile the 
substantial similarity test to the unique characteristics and nature of the digital 
sample. 
For example, in Saregama India, Ltd. v. Mosley, a record company brought an 
action against the defendants for an unauthorized digital sample included in 
their song “Put You on the Game” (PYOG).118  This sample borrowed a one-
second snippet of “Bagor Mein Bahar Hai” (BMBH), to which the record 
company owned the rights.119  Defendants admitted that they lifted the sample 
directly from the song, yet argued that the sound recordings of the two songs 
are not substantially similar.120  The plaintiff, on the other hand, retorted that 
substantial similarity does not apply because the very nature of the digital 
sample was an exact, literal copy of the original.121 
                                                                                                                   
 114 Id. at 802. 
 115 Id. at 804. 
 116 Id. at 804–05. 
 117 Id. at 804 (“Third, the record industry, including the recording artists, has the ability and 
know-how to work out guidelines, including a fixed schedule of license fees, if they so choose.”).  
See also Grand Upright Music Limited v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 182, 185 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (treating as significant that record companies such as Warner Bros. had a 
department specifically created to obtain licenses for samples). 
 118 Saregama India, Ltd. v. Mosley, 687 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1326 (S.D. Fla. 2009). 
 119 Id. at 1326–27. 
 120 Id. at 1326. 
 121 Id. at 1337. 
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Although the court conceded that literal copying occurred, it held the 
plaintiff must prove that there was both factual copying and substantial 
similarity.  According to the court, two works are substantially similar if the 
average person would recognize the original song from the copy and the two 
songs, taken as a whole, are substantially similar.122  “Other than the one-second 
snippet,” the court held that the songs “bear no similarities” as a whole and that 
“no reasonable jury, properly instructed, would mistake PYOG for BMBH or 
conclude that the two works were substantially similar.”123 
In its rejection of the Bridgeport court’s per se infringement doctrine, the 
Saregama court specifically took contention with the former’s interpretation of 
§ 114 of the Copyright Act.124  It concluded that the Bridgeport court’s exception 
for sound recordings erroneously expanded the definition of derivative works 
to include a work that contains any sound of the original recording, and hence 
declined to follow.125  The court also noted that the legislative history of § 114 
revealed no evidence that Congress enacted the statute for the purposes of 
providing a stricter standard for infringement of a copyright for a sound 
recording through expansion of what constituted a derivative work.126  Instead, 
the court remained firm in its conclusion that, in order to be considered a 
derivative work, the creation must bear substantial similarity to the original as 
well, and that a court’s examination should not cease after discovery of exact 
copying without license.127  Thus, the Saregama court’s rule for determining 
whether a song containing a digital sample infringes requires not only proof of 
exact copying of the sound recording, but also whether the derivative song 
reproduces or recaptures the substantial sounds so as to make it highly similar 
to the original recording.128  
Other courts, such as the District Court for the Southern District of New 
York in TufAmerica, Inc. v. Diamond, declined to follow the per se infringement 
standard of Bridgeport, yet also attempted to refine the substantial similarity test 
differently than the district court in Saregama.129  The dispute in TufAmerica 
involved unauthorized digital sampling by the Beastie Boys of numerous songs 
by musical group Trouble Funk, for which the plaintiff held the copyrights.130  
                                                                                                                   
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. at 1338. 
 124 Id. at 1339. 
 125 Id. at 1340. 
 126 Id. at 1341. 
 127 Id. at 1340–41.  This is known as the “Ordinary Observer” test. 
 128 Id. at 1341. 
 129 TufAmerica, Inc. v. Diamond, 968 F. Supp. 2d 588 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).  
 130 Id. at 592. 
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In the subsequent analyses of these numerous samples, the Second Circuit, 
similarly to Saregama, focused the bulk of its examination on the substantial 
similarity between each pair of songs.131  Although the court’s treatment and 
analysis pertaining to a digital sample largely resembles that of the district 
court’s in Saregama, it explicitly asserted that the “fragmented literal similarity” 
test should be used in cases of digital sampling, an adaption of the de minimis 
standard in which the court analyzes both the quantitative and qualitative 
aspects of the copy.132  The court held that this test fell under the general 
substantial similarity standard, but also maintained that it is a separate and 
specific test.133  As it is rooted in de minimis doctrine, the “fragmented literal 
similarity” test allows for literal copying of a “small and usually insignificant 
portion of the pre-existing work,”134 and thereby examines “whether the 
copying goes to trivial or substantial elements.”135  To determine if copying is 
substantial, the court deemed that it was more prudent to look at the 
“protectable elements” of the original work specifically within the sample, 
rather than looking more broadly at the “protectable elements of the work as 
whole.”136  The court achieved this by determining both the quantitative and 
qualitative significance of the sampled portion to the original work as a 
whole.137  Therefore, even if the sample may be quantitatively insignificant in 
that it copies mere seconds of the original work, the sample may still infringe if 
that portion is significant to the original, as it may decrease the transformative 
nature of the sampling song.138  The nature of the test ultimately requires a 
song-by-song analysis of each sample.139 
                                                                                                                   
 131 Id. at 590. 
 132 Id. at 596; see also Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 797 (6th Cir. 
2005).  This was the test utilized by the district court that was subsequently overturned by the 
Sixth Circuit. 
 133 TufAmerica, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 2d at 596. 
 134 Id. at 599. 
 135 Id. at 598; see also 4-13 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 23, § 1303[A][2][a] (stating that, in 
cases in which there is exact copying, one must determine “[a]t what point does such fragmented 
similarity become substantial so as to constitute the borrowing an infringement”). 
 136 TufAmerica, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 2d at 596, 598. 
 137 Id. at 598. 
 138 Id. at 602 (noting that in order for a portion to be deemed qualitatively significant, it must 
satisfy the general copyright requirements of being an “original” work, meaning that it must 
possess “at least some minimal degree of creativity”). 
 139 Id. at 599. 
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In effect, TufAmerica disregards one of the customarily used tests for 
substantial similarity, the Ordinary Observer test,140 and instead applies the 
more technical and specific “fragmented literal similarity test” in order to assess 
the legality of a digital sample.141  The ordinary observer test determines 
substantial similarity by inquiring whether an ordinary listener would be able, 
without purposefully “set[ting] out to dissect the disparities,” to recognize and 
identify the original work that is sampled,142 and conclude that the two works as 
a whole were substantially similar.  The Second Circuit held that this was an 
unfair burden for the plaintiff to meet; there is undisputed, exact copying of the 
original work, yet143 the sample normally consists of only a couple seconds of 
the original song and may be distorted or manipulated to fit the new track, 
making it almost unrecognizable.144  Due to the ordinarily diminutive nature of 
a digital sample, the TufAmerica court found it more prudent to examine the 
sample on its own (“the dissected portion”) rather than make a judgment based 
on the “protectable elements of the work as a whole.”145 
Overall, the examples of Grand Upright, Bridgeport, Saregama, and TufAmerica 
demonstrate the general disagreement amongst courts as to the proper legal 
assessment of an unauthorized, unlicensed digital sample.  Some still utilize the 
“ordinary observer” substantial similarity test, while others refine the substantial 
similarity de minimis analysis in an attempt to reconcile it with the inherent 
difficulties in analyzing digital samples.  Still others such as Grand Upright and 
Bridgeport emphasize the unique nature of digital sampling, which does not 
“involve the mere imitation of sounds, but rather the actual use of the copyright 
owner’s original work,”146 and therefore deem the presence of an unauthorized 
digital sample as per se infringement.  
                                                                                                                   
 140 Sarogama India, Ltd. v. Mosley, 687 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1338 (holding that there was no 
substantial similarity because “no reasonable jury, properly instructed,” would mistake the 
derivative work from the original or conclude that the two works were substantially similar). 
 141 TufAmerica, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 2d at 596–97, 602 (“[T]he focus is on the qualitative and 
quantitative aspects of the allegedly infringed sample to the pre-existing work, not to the infringing 
work.” (emphasis added)). 
 142 Id. at 596. 
 143 Id. at 597 (“[I]n cases of fragmented literal similarity, there are no blurred lines between what 
was or was not taken.”). 
 144 Id. at 602 (stating that the “audibility” or discernment of the sample is not the basis of the 
examination). 
 145 Id. at 596–97. 
 146 Reilly, supra note 74, at 366 (emphasis added). 
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III.  ANALYSIS 
A.  THE DEFICIENCIES OF THE SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY TEST, FRAGMENTED 
LITERAL SIMILARITY TEST, AND PER SE INFRINGEMENT STANDARD FOR 
DIGITAL SAMPLING 
As evidenced by the fact that the federal circuit is starkly split on the issue of 
digital sampling, the reliance on case law to establish a workable standard of 
treatment for the practice has proven to be problematic.  The lack of cohesive 
stance on its legality has yielded inconsistent judgments, and this confusion 
continues to have a negative effect on both the sampling artists and the 
rightsholders.  While a split in the federal circuit is certainly not uncommon or 
unique to digital sampling, the pervasiveness of the practice in the music 
industry and the ever-increasing litigation147 suggests that a more extensive 
measure—by way of a congressional amendment—needs to be taken. 
Each of the varying tests that courts have adopted for digital sampling cases 
has certain merits and is based firmly on copyright law principles, yet none of 
these approaches, standing alone, provides a full and adequate solution.  In 
consideration of the current state of the music industry, the complex and 
varying nature of the digital sample, and the creative balance that copyright law 
seeks to maintain, each of these tests is insufficient in resolving the issue of 
unauthorized digital sampling. 
The lack of consensus on the legal treatment of digital sampling has induced 
a flood of litigation, prompting some courts to establish a hard-line rule to 
efficiently handle such litigation.  Though the intent of Bridgeport to create a 
bright-line standard in the interest of organization was legitimate, the Sixth 
Circuit precariously based its holding on an interpretation of section 114 of the 
Copyright Act.148  The construction of section 114 as effectively deeming any 
unauthorized digital sample to be infringement is to disregard the legislative 
intent behind the section’s inclusion.  The very purpose of section 114 was to 
actually limit the exclusive rights of copyright owners outlined in section 106, 
not expand them.149  The Bridgeport court, nonetheless, employed the statute to 
effectively expand the rights of the copyright holders rather than to limit them, 
more or less eliminating any fair use argument or consideration as to promoting 
creativity and act achieving the balance sought by the framers.150  In doing so, it 
discarded the use of any type of substantial similarity test for digital sampling 
                                                                                                                   
 147 See Fassler, supra note 14. 
 148 Bridgeport Music, Inc., 410 F.3d at 799. 
 149 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 23, § 13.03[A][2][b]. 
 150 Id. 
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cases, despite the customary use of these tests in both music and sound 
recording copyright cases.151  The legislative history surrounding the copyright-
ability of sound recordings further evidences the incongruent nature of this 
holding; Congress “explicitly noted . . . that ‘infringement takes place whenever 
all or any substantial portion of the actual sounds that go to make up a 
copyrighted sound recording are reproduced.’ ”152  It is evident that Bridgeport 
was, by all accounts, an unprecedented holding unanticipated not only by 
previous adjudication but also by the Copyright Act itself. 
The Bridgeport court did, however, clearly acknowledge the abrupt and 
arbitrary nature of its holding, as evidenced by its deconstruction of the 
substantial similarity tests and conclusion that these failed to establish true 
consistency in the law.153  This assertion, although diverging from the 
customary analysis used to determine copyright infringement, is not without 
merit.  Whatever its practical value in other areas of copyright law, the general 
substantial similarity test (the analysis of which rests primarily on the “ordinary 
observer” test) presents unique difficulties when applied to a legal analysis of a 
digital sample. 
In particular, the general substantial similarity test, which relies on the 
Ordinary Observer test, errs in that it requires an unreasonably high burden of 
proof from the copyright holder, and offers too ambiguous a standard by which 
the sampler must measure his work.  Due to the nature of a digital sample, this 
test must be applied in many cases to a musical excerpt that rarely exceeds three 
to six seconds.154  As such, the rightsholder is usually unable to establish that the 
whole “essence” of the original sound recording was appropriated within such a 
small extraction.  Moreover, this short amount of time also provides a minimal 
probability that an ordinary observer would be able to discern the original work in 
the sample.  The fact that many samples distort and manipulate the excerpt of the 
original sound, sometimes even to the point where it is unrecognizable, also 
provides a loophole by which the sampler can avoid liability for infringement 
under the ordinary observer test.155  It therefore seems that the rightsholder 
would only potentially succeed on this prong of the substantial similarity test 
when the sample is continuously looped throughout the work and is at once 
recognizable to the ordinary observer.  As the court in TufAmerica reasoned, the 
test guides the court to adopt an overbroad approach in which it views the song 
                                                                                                                   
 151 Id. 
 152 Id. at 13–61 (emphasis in original). 
 153 Bridgeport Music, Inc., 410 F.3d at 802. 
 154 See Morrison, supra note 71, at 90–91 (identifying the three typical digital samples utilized by 
artists). 
 155 Id. at 91. 
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as a whole and fails to properly pinpoint the bulk of its examination on the 
sample at issue.  This incorrect focus is highly problematic when the contents of 
the sample make up less than a few seconds of each song, and is altogether not 
conducive to the accurate assessment of a digital sample.  
While the substantial similarity test may be too general of a test for digital 
sampling, the fragmented literal similarity test—a derivation of the de minimis 
doctrine—adopted by the Second Circuit in TufAmerica is an improvement in 
that it more accurately and specifically analyzes the finer points and nature of a 
digital sample.  Unlike the substantial similarity test, the fragmented literal 
similarity approach factors into the examination the fact that the sample is an 
exact copy.156  This test accounts for the short duration of the sample by 
focusing not on the two songs as a whole, but instead by inspecting the content 
of the sample and that snippet’s relation to the original work.  If the copied 
portion is not substantial to the original, the copying is considered de minimis 
and not infringement.  The two-factor test, in which the court evaluates the 
sampled portion’s quantitative and qualitative significance to the original, is a 
more sound approach for litigating issues of digital sampling, in theory.  
However, in practice, the subsequent survey of the sample by the court plays 
out in much the same manner as the general substantial similarity test. 
Under the fragmented literal similarity test, the question of whether a sample 
is deemed de minimis copying or infringement will often hinge solely on the 
qualitative significance of the snippet to the original.157  Although the test’s 
reliance on the court’s own diagnosis and expert testimony is prudent compared 
to the deference of the ordinary observer test, the standard of proof remains 
rather vague and unpredictable, as there is no clear definition of “qualitative” or 
“substantial.”158  The original song’s hook would clearly qualify, but anything 
beyond that is speculative.  What is considered infringement and what is 
regarded as a de minimis use is determined on a case-by-case basis, with little to 
no hard-line rules to follow.  The test still allows for legal uncertainty for both 
the sampler and samplee, especially for the inexperienced amateur artist.  As the 
court in Bridgeport accurately stated, the application of this particular substantial 
similarity test (fragmented literal similarity) in the examination of a digital 
sample requires extensive “mental, musicological, and technological 
                                                                                                                   
 156 Gregory, supra note 47, at 81. 
 157 Id. at 82 (“In unauthorized sampling, copyright holders do not have a strong remedy 
available [under fragmented literal similarity test] unless the sample was qualitatively important 
such as a song’s hook. . . .”). 
 158 Id. (citing a song’s “hook” as an example of a qualitatively significant portion of the original 
work). 
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gymnastics” that can quickly devolve into a subjective and muddled process.159  
Inevitably, this type of exercise, demanding much in the way of time and 
resources, puts a strain on judicial economy.160  In consideration of the fact that 
digital sampling is an integral and pervasive element in the current musical 
climate, lengthy and slow-moving litigation benefits neither the sampler nor the 
sampled artist.  These drawn-out cases, seemingly contradictory decisions, and 
inconsistent enforcement will do little to tame the chaos of the populist, online 
music culture. Yet, Bridgeport, while correct in its assertion that a “bright-line” 
rule was needed in the industry, ultimately settled on one that caused numerous 
problems of its own. 
With neither an explicit provision in the Copyright Act nor a Supreme Court 
ruling on the issue, legal treatment of the digital sample has been determined by 
each court’s own interpretation and construction of various copyright law 
provisions.  The resulting tests applied to digital sampling have proven to be 
insufficient, and do not adequately reconcile the nature of the digital sample and 
changing musical landscape with the intended principles and purposes of 
copyright law.  Consequently, this lack of uniform treatment has had a 
profound effect on the music industry and especially the amateur artist. 
B.  THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF THE LAW ON THE AMATEUR ARTIST 
While the elimination of the substantial similarity test as a uniform standard 
was arguably a step in the right direction in terms of litigating the use of an 
unauthorized digital sample, the rule set forth by the Bridgeport court ultimately 
overcorrected the problems associated with substantial similarity.  In its pursuit 
of judicial efficiency, a bright-line rule, and better protection for copyright 
owners, it subsequently afforded rightsholders a level of exclusion that tipped 
the balance too heavily in their favor.  Similar to the position in which the 
substantial similarity test formerly placed rightsholders, this rule gives the 
sampling artist—particularly the amateur, unsigned artist—little chance to 
prevail in a suit for unauthorized sampling.161  In essence, under the rule that 
any unauthorized sample is per se infringement, a sampling artist’s only viable 
option to avoid liability after Bridgeport is to examine his or her work for any 
unauthorized samples and officially obtain any licenses necessary to authorize 
them.  On its face, this may appear fair, but the complexities provide difficult to 
navigate for the amateur, unsigned artist in the digital age for several reasons.   
                                                                                                                   
 159 Id. at 80. 
 160 Id. 
 161 Id. at 84 (stating that, under Bridgeport, any sampling, “no matter how de minimis, and even 
without any similarity between the two works, constitutes copyright infringement”). 
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First, the per se infringement standard for digital sampling requires a 
“tedious and subjective analysis” by the artist of his or her created work, one in 
which a certain level of expertise in the field of music may be more of a 
necessity than a mere advantage.  As one musician put it, the artist, in order to 
release a song that complies with current law, must break down “ ‘every single 
component of every track that [he or she] [makes] and . . . go through every 
little blip of sound and decide what’s significant enough that we need to contact 
the owner.’ ”162  At present, when the creation of recorded music requires a far 
less intensive process than ever before, and as the allure of quick fame from 
one upload has never been higher, it is irrational to assume that the majority of 
amateur, unsigned artists will conduct such an intricate analysis. 
Even upon the acknowledgement of a sampled portion, the artist may still 
inevitably confront difficulties identifying both the original source of the 
sample, as well as the proper copyright owner of the sound recording.163  In 
many instances, it is the record companies rather than the creators or artists 
themselves that hold both the composition and sound recording copyrights.164  
To further complicate matters, a parent company or label may hold the 
copyright to a musical composition while a different record label or subsidiary 
of the record company holds the copyright to a sound recording.  Thus, the 
sampling musician may have to contact two different parties and negotiate for 
two separate licensing fees in order to implement a digital sample into his or her 
work.165 
Additionally, the negotiating process offers no guarantees of the artist’s 
good faith effort to legally obtain the proper licenses for the sample.  Because 
the act of licensing a sample (or an entire song for that matter) to another artist 
does not fall under compulsory licensing, the copyright owner possesses no 
legal obligation to license the sample upon negotiation.166  In effect, this results 
                                                                                                                   
 162 Id. at 80 (quoting Mike D., a member of the alternative rock/hip-hop group the Beastie 
Boys, on the process of vetting a song for any potential legal issues regarding digital samples).  
 163 Reilly, supra note 74, at 365. 
 164 Id. at 364 (stating that record companies “typically claim exclusive ownership of sound 
recordings through recording contracts and assignments of ownership” from the creators). 
 165 Id. at 365 (outlining a hypothetical in which the sampling artist would have to “contact 
Sony/ATV Music Publishing and Michael Jackson to obtain rights to use the composition” and 
would also have to bargain with the subsidiary label (Capitol Records) to obtain a license for the 
sound recording). 
 166 PASSMAN, supra note 33, at 376 (noting that, “since there’s no compulsory license for 
samples,” the artist has to make “whatever deal the rights owners decide to bless [them] with”). 
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in an unequal bargaining scenario in which the rightsholder firmly controls the 
petitioning artist, and fees for the sample can subsequently skyrocket.167 
With the rights holders possessing all the power in the ensuing negotiations, 
the agreement reached between the rights holders and the sampling artist is not 
normally a one-time flat fee for use of the sample.  Instead, the artist will have 
to indefinitely forfeit a portion of each future sale as a royalty payment to the 
holder of the sound recording copyright.168  Yet, the forfeiture of profits is 
rarely limited to royalty payments to the rightsholder, for the publisher (or 
publishers in certain instances) will almost always demand both a percentage of 
the profits, and a partial ownership of the copyright for the song at issue.  
Depending upon both the royalty rate agreed upon, as well as the amount of 
publishers involved with the original work, it is even possible that the sampling 
artist will have to pay out-of-pocket for the song’s publication (or upload) into 
the public sphere.169  Moreover, terms of the agreement do include shared 
ownership of the copyright, which means that an artist seeking a license for a 
song’s use in an advertisement or movie would have to obtain the permission of 
the publisher(s) of the original work in order to do so.170 
Upon reaching an agreement the artist, under the per se infringement rule 
put forth by Bridgeport, could potentially lose both any profit from the creation, 
as well as control over its copyright, for an unauthorized two-second sample within 
the song.171  Undoubtedly, the combination of these factors only further 
incentivizes an artist to move forward with the sample in the hopes that “the 
original artist will either not learn of the use or find it too troublesome to sue,” 
or, alternatively, to abandon his creative endeavor altogether.172  
As it stands, case law does little to provide a disincentive to the masses of 
unsigned, amateur artists from continuing the culture of “borrow now, ask 
later” and uploading songs with unauthorized samples.  Indeed, this behavior 
pervades all corners of the internet despite the holdings of Bridgeport and Grand 
Upright Music.  The seemingly arbitrary nature of legal outcomes confronting 
even high-profile artists with unauthorized use of their samples creates a 
                                                                                                                   
 167 Reilly, supra note 74, at 364 (“Sample licenses may be as high as $5,000 in buyout fees for a 
three-second sample that is ‘looped.’ ”).  
 168 PASSMAN, supra note 33, at 376 (declaring that, for a sample derived from the master recording, 
the holder “will always want a royalty,” usually in the range of three to eight cents per sale). 
 169 Id. (stating that publishers “almost always” demand partial copyright ownership of the track 
and a percentage of the publishing income). 
 170 Id. (“Even when [the artist] get[s] past all these hurdles, the publishers (and some record 
companies) will often limit the usage of their sample to [the artist’s] records or promo videos.”). 
 171 Reilly, supra note 74, at 357. 
 172 Id. at 364. 
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mindset that the reward outweighs the risk.  Similarly, the smaller, unsigned 
artists proceed thinking they can get away with their “theft.” 
Altogether, each of these standards regarding unauthorized digital sampling 
present issues for adequate enforcement and negatively affect amateur artists as 
a consequence.  With such a large pool of amateur, free uploads scattered 
across the internet on multiple sites173 (e.g., thirty-eight million users on 
Soundcloud alone) and no clear standard, third parties bear a difficult burden.  
Moreover, this type of enforcement mechanism gives third parties (such as 
websites themselves) too much discretionary power.  It requires them to sift 
through countless tracks (with more inevitably being uploaded each day), 
recognize the presence of a sample, check whether such sample is authorized, 
and then notify the pertinent rights holder of the sound recording that was 
sampled.  Consequently, this type of enforcement allows third parties to decide 
subjectively which songs will remain unless otherwise notified.  Given the 
impracticability of enforcing these requirements, it follows that enforcement 
against unauthorized digital samples has been inconsistent. 
To merely claim that the anemic enforcement of the case law is the sole 
reason for the rampant unauthorized sampling, however, ignores the important 
cultural and industry-wide issues that undoubtedly also contribute to the 
infringement.  While the lack of knowledge regarding the process of gaining 
official authorization may not be the fault of the legal system, the process itself 
is tailored to an outdated era.  No longer can samples only be created in the 
confines of a professional studio or through well-practiced expertise.  To be 
sure, those signed musicians recording commercially released tracks for record 
companies still have the resources at hand by which to gain authorization, or at 
least to be made aware of potential sampling issues.174  Yet, it is evident from 
the array of cases regarding digital sampling that record companies either do not 
allocate enough resources to helping artists avoid potential infringement, or are 
equally confounded by the legal complexities surrounding the activity.175  Even 
these artists—who at the very least possess an awareness of the legal necessity 
to authorize samples—fall prey to infringement.  Hence, the amateur artist who 
is likely unaware of this process will almost certainly fail to comply with the 
legal standard for digital sampling.  
The cloak of anonymity these unsigned artists once wore as protection from 
any legal action continues to disappear as the music industry shifts more and 
                                                                                                                   
 173 For example, there are thirty-eight million users on Soundcloud alone.  See Mac, supra note 5. 
 174 See PASSMAN, supra note 33, at 375 (“Record companies won’t release a record containing 
samples without assurances that the samples have been cleared . . . .”). 
 175 See Gregory, supra note 47, at 80 (“[A]rtists are forced to determine, often without legal 
training or counsel, whether a sampled sound recording infringes the copyright-holder’s rights.”). 
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more of its presence online.  Just as the Bridgeport court cited the influx of digital 
samples at the turn of the century as part of its justification for altering the 
law,176 so the court system should respond to this phenomenon of massive 
digital sampling by amateur artists as reason to further alter the current rules 
and judicial decisions pertaining to sampling. 
Though the Bridgeport court arrived at an impractical conclusion, its attempt 
to establish a bright-line rule in the interest of judicial efficiency and consistency 
was indeed prudent.  Because digital sampling has become so integrated in 
mainstream commercially released music and is also in millions of amateur 
compositions across the internet, the law needs stability and organization in its 
treatment of the practice.  Contrary to the implication of the Bridgeport ruling, 
which tends to eviscerate an influential market and culture, in reality and in fact 
not all acts of unauthorized digital sampling can be treated fairly under one 
uniform standard due to the highly variant nature of digital samples.  Rather, 
they must be separated and properly categorized according to these variables, so 
that the law can maintain a fair standard for each category of unauthorized 
digital samples. 
C.  THE SOLUTION: FAIR USE AND COMPULSORY LICENSING 
As courts seem perpetually split on how to handle the unauthorized sample, 
it appears that suits involving unauthorized sampling will only increase, for 
artists will be continually uncertain as to the legality of such conduct.  This may 
eventually deter the artists from crafting what would have been a creative 
transformative work, subsequently harming the music industry and depriving 
society of enjoyment of such work, and potential creative inspiration from it.  
In order to solve this issue in a timely manner, Congress should amend the 
Copyright Act to include the legality and treatment of digital sampling.  Due to 
the nature of the digital sample, the convenience and ubiquity of sampling in 
today’s music climate, and copyright law concerns pertaining to exclusive rights 
and the market of the author’s work, not even unauthorized sample should be 
treated identically.  As such, digital sampling should be subdivided into the 
following three categories in the amendment: (1) unauthorized digital sampling 
in a non-commercially released track; (2) unauthorized digital sampling in a 
track that garners a profit for an artist/author; and finally (3) unauthorized 
digital sampling in a commercially released track.  Congress should outline a 
separate, distinct standard for each of these categories, based on the way in 
which a song is released, as well as any profits garnered from the song. 
                                                                                                                   
 176 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 798–99 (6th Cir. 2005). 
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1.  Unauthorized Digital Sample in a Noncommercially Released Track.  The first 
and arguably largest category that must be addressed is the unauthorized digital 
sampling in non-commercially released track.  A sizable portion of the music 
available on sites such as YouTube, illegal-art.net, and Soundcloud are available 
for free listening and download, and have been created by amateur artists who 
have neither a record deal nor profits from their artistic endeavors.177  It can be 
assumed that any digital sample within the majority of these amateur creations 
is unauthorized, as it would be both highly difficult and a highly imprudent 
investment.178  Proponents of a blanket law prohibiting such unauthorized 
sampling argue that this is exactly the type of practice from which copyright law 
protects right holders; it is the copying of another’s original work without 
permission, an act that can diminish the artistic value of the work as well as the 
artist’s control over how it is heard.179  For an unauthorized digital sample in an 
amateur’s non-commercially released composition, however, infringers can 
assert a fair use defense. 
For this category of unauthorized digital sampling, which is pervasive among 
large communities and sites across the internet, a standard such as Bridgeport’s 
rule of per se infringement would substantially harm an individual whose work 
relied upon one or more samples, thus eliminating much of the current music 
culture because few would be able to obtain the necessary license agreement.  
Even the slightly more flexible “fragmented literal similarity” test could 
potentially do the same; the uncertainty as to what is considered infringement 
increases unease and risk, and it impedes the use of a qualitative, recognizable 
portion of an original that is regularly used in mash-ups and for creative 
purposes in other tracks.  
The preservation of this culture should be of concern, not only for its sheer 
size and prevalence, but also due to the fact that, even at its most simplistic use, 
unauthorized digital samples involve some element of creative expression.  
Whether the sample is a looped segment, a “collage,” or a mash-up, the 
placement and engagement of the sample by the sampler into a new or different 
context transforms that tune into something apart from the original.  As DJ Girl 
Talk, a highly popular artist of this sampling culture that utilizes the mash-up 
method, aptly described, his songs are meant to be “something brand new, 
                                                                                                                   
 177 Mac, supra note 5 (noting that Soundcloud, the audio sharing company, had “seen registered 
numbers pass the 30 million mark” and was created for the purpose of musicians to share work 
and “get feedback”). 
 178 See Reilly, supra note 74, at 364. 
 179 Bridgeport Music, Inc., 410 F.3d at 792 n.23. 
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something that transcends [their] source material altogether.”180  Although all 
artists are not able to achieve such successful or even artistically progressive 
transformations with their use of unauthorized samples, valuable creative 
expression is nevertheless present in this “artistic recontextualization or 
manipulation.”181  
Opponents of this treatment of unauthorized digital sampling argue that 
such a practice is stealing and diminishes the author’s rights to the work, yet this 
position fails to recognize the nature and benefits of sampling. This practice is 
not an attempt by the sampler to deem a segment or portion of an original song 
as his own work, accidentally or deceptively; on the contrary, the sampling 
arguably acts almost as a promotion and advertisement of the original in some 
cases. In an empirical study on “the effect that digital sampling has on sales of 
copyrighted songs,” findings demonstrated that (to a 92.5% degree of statistical 
significance) the songs sampled in Girl Talk’s most recent album, at the time of 
the 2013 study,  “sold better in the year after being sampled relative to the year 
before.”182  Even if such a correlation is difficult to prove with certainty, these 
are non-commercially released tracks that gain no real profit.  Moreover, these 
songs are not likely to be a market substitute for the original work since they are 
not released into the commercial market; the artist is not side-stepping the 
digital sampling market or decreasing the market value of the original work 
since there no tangible profits.  Due to the lack of profits, the artist is also not 
unfairly avoiding the customary royalty rate for the sample as well.  It is of no 
consequence that not all amateur artists create equally meritorious works; the 
transformative nature of the use, the sheer prevalence of such use, and the lack 
of negative effect on the value of the sampled work should protect non-
commercially released tracks with an unlicensed digital sample from as a 
legitimate derivative market under fair use doctrine. 
2.  Unauthorized Digital Sample in a Noncommercially Released Track that Garners 
Profit for an Amateur Artist.  The treatment of unauthorized sampling, however, 
must be adjusted in the event that the noncommercially released track 
containing the sample garners a profit.  While some argue that fair use should 
extend even to those tracks that garner an actual profit, to do so would 
ultimately ignore the increased stakes and interests of the rightsholder with this 
change in circumstances.  Though much of the fair use defense remains the 
same, the fourth factor in section 107 (market substitution) tips slightly in favor 
                                                                                                                   
 180 Jeffrey Omari, MIX AND MASH, The Digital Sampling of Music has Stretched the Meaning of the 
Fair Use Defense, L.A. LAW., Sept. 2010, at 35. 
 181 Id. 
 182 W. Michael Schuster, Fair Use, Girl Talk, and Digital Sampling: An Empirical Study of Music 
Sampling’s Effect on the Market for Copyrighted Works, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2340235. 
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of the rightsholder due to the presence of profit.183  Though a track possessing 
a digital sample of the original may not act as a market substitute for that 
original work, there are other issues pertaining to artistic value and fairness that 
are heightened as a result of the track garnering profits. Although the amateur 
composition may be transformative in nature, the artist in this case would 
essentially be sidestepping a market if he or she were allowed to continue 
without payment and consent for the license.  Therefore, the amateur artist in 
this instance should not be able to merely assert a fair use defense to avoid 
liability, and will subsequently be subject to the compulsory licensing fee created 
by the amendment. 
3.  Unauthorized Digital Sample in a Commercially Released Track.  A commercially 
released track by an official artist that garners profit must clear any samples by 
obtaining a license agreement with the rightsholder, resulting in a fee and 
possibly royalty rates.  Consequently, to allow an amateur artist to profit from a 
song that contains a sample without compensating the rightsholders would 
allow the artist to profit from exploitation without paying the customary price.  
In addition, the argument that such a track represents a protectable derivative 
market would be tenuous, for most songs that both contain unauthorized digital 
samples and profit the artist become the subject of a lawsuit.  Overall, the 
balance of factors weighs more heavily in favor of the rightsholders, thereby 
rendering fair use an inadequate solution unauthorized digital samples in 
commercially released tracks. 
In order to best resolve the legal issues surrounding those songs which both 
contain unauthorized samples and garner profits, whether commercially 
released or otherwise, Congress needs to take action.  First, an amateur artist 
that profits off a song with an unlicensed digital sample should be required to 
pay a compulsory licensing fee.  To accomplish this, Congress must amend 
section 115 (compulsory licensing for non-dramatic musical works) to include a 
subsection for digital samples.  The subsection would provide that an artist 
must pay a standard, compulsory licensing fee for an unauthorized sample in a 
non-commercially released track if (a) the majority of the committee determines 
that the sample is not de minimis use under the “fragmented literal similarity” test 
and (b) the track ultimately garners the artist a profit or is publicly performed 
for profit.  If the artist does not report the song, sample, and subsequent profits 
to the Copyright Office within a reasonable time period, the fee should 
increase.  In the event that the Register should decide that the work is not 
copyrightable, a cease and desist order would be given.  Finally, the amendment 
                                                                                                                   
 183 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012); see also supra text accompanying note 48. 
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would require the Copyright Office to create a committee of musical experts 
chosen by the Register to handle sampling disputes and judgments.  
In addition, any artist who commercially releases a track found to have an 
unlicensed digital sample would have to pay a compulsory licensing fee.  This 
fee, however, should be larger in comparison to the one for a non-commercially 
released track, as it was officially released with the explicit purpose of gaining 
monetary profit.  The rightsholder, upon discovery (or belief) that the original 
work was sampled without permission, would be required by statute to report 
this to the Copyright Office.  Then the Register would notify the committee of 
musical experts and, if not deemed de minimis use, the Register would issue a 
standard fee equal to the average licensing fee184 normally charged by the 
rightsholder to sample that work.  The amendment would also allow for a 
separate cause of action to be filed by rightsholders who feel that the 
unauthorized use fails the general substantial similarity test as well.  The 
reasoning for this inclusion is two-part: (1) the argument that the sampling song 
was a creative and transformative work would be greatly diminished, and (2) 
allowing such conduct would not promote further creativity and creative works.  
In order to deter frivolous claims from flooding the federal courts, however, a 
filing of a separate lawsuit should eliminate the obtainment of the licensing fee.  
On the other hand, if the court holds that the unauthorized use was indeed 
intentional, the sampling artist will be liable for damages exceeding the 
compulsory licensing fee.  
In essence, this amendment would opt to subdivide the different instances 
of unauthorized digital sampling into three identifiable categories, and prescribe 
different standards for each category.  First, for those unauthorized digital 
samples within non-commercially released songs that elicit no profit, such 
samples should fall under fair use and the artist should not be liable for the 
infringement.  Second, in the event that a non-commercially released song both 
garners a profit and is not a de minimis sample under the fragmented literal 
similarity test, the artist would be subject to a compulsory licensing fee.  This 
fee would be significantly less than the fair market value for such a sample.  
Third, the unauthorized sample in a commercial track is given the strictest 
treatment, although the commercial artist would still benefit from the 
amendment as well.  It would implement a compulsory licensing fee, the value 
of which would be a set rate equal to the market value of the sample in that 
                                                                                                                   
 184  Alex Mayyaoi, The Economics of Girl Talk, PRICEONOMICS BLOG (Oct. 1, 2014, 10:30 AM), 
http://blog.princeonomics.com/post/47719281228/the-economics-of-girl-talk (advocating that 
with a fixed rate, “artists would still be compensated if someone samples that music, but it would 
be automatic, predictable, and (hopefully) affordable”). 
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year.  Because of the resources at their disposal and a greater awareness of the 
legal implications of a digital sample, the amendment holds this commercial 
artist to a higher standard, and allows for a separate cause of action to be filed 
by the rights holder if it is argued that such unauthorized sampling fails even the 
general substantial similarity test.  These subdivisions, based on the way in 
which the song is released and whether any profits were garnered, account for 
the changes in the music industry and ensure that each instance of unauthorized 
digital sampling is in accord with the principles of copyright law and the balance 
that the Framers hoped to achieve. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Overall, the inconsistent legal treatment of unauthorized digital sampling, 
coupled with the ever-expanding market for and use of sampling in music 
culture, has left artists uncertain of the legal standard; thus, continuous legal 
disputes continue.  The varied judicial approaches have failed to provide a clear, 
balanced standard that properly accounts for the present state of the music 
industry.  To deem any unauthorized sampling as per se infringement, as the 
Bridgeport court concluded, may ultimately erode what has become a sizable 
market in the music industry.  Even though the TufAmerica court’s “fragmented 
literal similarity” test presents a far more flexible standard, it would still 
eliminate those noncommercial releases that utilize samples comprising a 
qualitatively significant portion of the original song.  While seemingly fair, this 
test would effectively deter noncommercial mash-up songs because these rely 
almost exclusively on sampling recognizable, substantial elements of multiple 
originals and mixing them together in a creative manner to form a new 
experience for the listener.  
Nevertheless, unauthorized digital sampling constitutes copying a portion of 
another’s work without permission, and its prevalence is not a sufficient 
justification for its legal acceptance.  Whereas other common illegal acts in the 
music market, such as online piracy, fail to provide any significant, meritorious 
contribution that justifies protection from liability in lieu of favoring 
rightsholders, unauthorized sampling exhibits a viable transformative quality 
that artistically enhances the music industry and its creative works as a whole.  
The creative expression in the use of a given sample, authorized or not, can 
provide enjoyment to listeners, influence the work of other artists, and even 
potentially increase the market value of the sampled song.  With music-making 
capability ever-increasing along with the development of new technologies, 
unauthorized digital sampling appears to be an inevitable constant of future 
music culture.  As the market and body of work that utilizes this practice grows 
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along with the perpetual stream of digital sampling lawsuits, it is in the best 
interest of the legal system, the artists, and the music industry for copyright law 
to directly address this issue. 
Therefore, Congress should enact the amendment in the interest of 
maintaining copyright laws applicability to the changing music landscape.  By 
separating the different categories of unauthorized digital sampling based on the 
type of release and whether the song elicited profits, the amendment would 
ensure that each is treated in accord with the Framer’s purposing in establishing 
copyright law.  Attempting to adopt one uniform standard for all three 
categories is simply infeasible, as is waiting for the courts to craft a viable 
solution.  In all, the solution offered here, which employs both fair use and 
compulsory licensing, would continue to protect the artistic and commercial 
value of original works while also promoting further innovation and growth. 
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